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The Constitutional Dimensions of
Student-Initiated Religious Activity in
Public High Schools
Official school board recognition of student-initiated religious activity in
public high schools has been consistently held to violate the establishment
clause.1 The courts have concluded that such recognition would produce a
religious effect and therefore be unconstitutional. This view rests on the
assumption that high school students are too immature to distinguish the
school board's passive accommodation of student-initiated religious activity
from its active endorsement of religion.
This Note first demonstrates that student-initiated religious expression
is protected speech. A school board may therefore discriminate against re-
ligious speech only to advance a compelling state interest. The Note then
turns to a consideration of the most relevant state interest: avoidance of an
establishment clause violation. It finds that both case law dealing with
controversial nonreligious issues and studies on adolescent psychology in-
dicate that the high school student is able and likely to distinguish be-
tween accommodation and endorsement. The courts' emphasis in the reli-
gious context on the students' supposed lack of intellectual and emotional
maturity should therefore be abandoned. Instead of imposing a blanket
prohibition on all student-initiated religious activity in the high school,
courts should focus on the character of the activity and on whether the
school board's involvement is sufficient to raise establishment clause con-
cerns.2 Finally, the Note argues that public high schools should regulate
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion. . . ").
2. The analysis of this Note applies only to grades 10-12, and not to elementary or junior high
schools. Also, it applies only to student-initiated activity held before or after school or during un-
scheduled free time within school hours. See infra pp. 514-15.
The following fictitious request for school board recognition of student-initiated religious activity
describes the kind of activity at issue in this Note:
Students for Religious Growth, a group of twenty-five students from grades 10 through 12,
requests permission to become part of Our Public High School's program of student-initiated
extracurricular activities. The purpose of Students for Religious Growth is to develop through
worship, discussion, and reflection a personal religious awareness, an understanding of other
religions, and a tolerance of conflicting views.
We wish to meet on school premises to facilitate participation for current members and to
allow other students who so desire to join the group. Our meetings would be held only before
or after the school day, or during unscheduled free time within school hours. We request
school support only in the form of a meeting place and a faculty supervisor to comply with the
school's safety and order regulations.
Students for Religious Growth will assume full responsibility for organizing, scheduling,
and directing the activities of the group. The group will in no way attempt to claim official
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extracurricular religious expression only according to "content-neutral"
standards or to further a compelling state interest.
I. Student-Initiated Religious Expression as Protected Speech
Any discussion of the constitutional dimensions of student-initiated reli-
gious expression must begin by considering whether such expression is
protected speech under the First Amendment. In Healy v. James,3 the
Supreme Court affirmed that neither "students [nior teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."4 Accordingly, it held that the First Amendment protected student
political groups from denial of official recognition as a result of the college
president's dislike for the group's viewpoint.5 The Court noted that the
president's denial of recognition "was a form of prior restraint, . . . [and
that] a 'heavy burden' rests on the College to demonstrate the appropri-
ateness of that action."' More specifically, in Widmar v. Vincent," the
Court explicitly held that college students' religious worship and discus-
sion are "forms of speech and association protected by the First Amend-
ment." ' The Court, following the analysis defifted in Healy, then inquired
whether the university met the "heavy burden" necessary to justify re-
stricting students' protected speech. 9
The Court's willingness to construe student expression as protected
speech has not been limited to the college context. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District,10 it held that the wearing of arm-
bands by high school and junior high school students was "closely akin to
'pure speech' . . . [and thus] entitled to comprehensive protection under
the First Amendment."1 It then stated that "[in the absence of a specific
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views." 2 Thus, the religious
expression of high school students comes within the scope of First Amend-
ment protection of free speech. 13
Even though high school students' religious expression is protected
approval or endorsement of its activities or views. Students for Religious Growth seeks only to
become one of the many student-initiated activities already recognized to pursue students' ex-
tracurricular interests.
3. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
4. Id. at 180 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
5. Id. at 187.
6. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
7. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
8. Id. at 269.
9. Id. at 270-77.
10. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
11. Id. at 505-06.
12. Id. at 511.
13. See infra note 37 (discussing student free speech rights).
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speech, the school board is not obligated to provide a student group with a
forum for extracurricular expression. Such an affirmative obligation, man-
dated by the free exercise clause,14 would arise only when no alternative
means of expression exists. 5 Because students have opportunities outside
the public high school for religious expression and worship, the board has
no such affirmative obligation."6
The free speech analysis leads to a different result, however, when the
school voluntarily opens a forum for extracurricular activity; that is, when
it "makes its facilities generally available for the [extracurricular] activi-
ties of registered student groups.' 7 After having permitted students to
initiate extracurricular activity, the school board may not discriminate
among proposed programs according to its approval of the content of those
programs.' Though not all regulation according to content is per se un-
constitutional, the school board does bear a heavy burden in demonstrat-
ing a compelling state interest in denying recognition to religious groups
while recognizing other more secularly oriented groups.' 9 Avoidance of an
establishment clause violation would undoubtedly be one such state inter-
est.20 Indeed, courts have upheld school board denial of recognition prima-
rily on this ground.2' Accordingly, our inquiry into the constitutionality of
student-initiated religious expression now turns to whether such expres-
sion necessarily violates the establishment clause.
II. Establishment Clause Concerns
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,22 the Supreme Court articulated a three-part
"purpose-effect-entanglement" test to determine an establishment clause
violation. To be deemed constitutional, the state action must have a "secu-
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ...prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] . . ").
15. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1048 (5th Cir.
1982) ("A school is obligated to provide religious facilities only if its failure to do so would effectively
foreclose a person's practice of religion."); see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123
(1981); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-8, at 835 (1978).
16. See Brandon, 635 F.2d at 977.
17. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1981).
18. As the Court has stated:
There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all points of
view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by
some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of
what they intend to say.
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1971); see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
19. See supra p. 500.
20. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
21. See infra note 26.
22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 92: 499, 1983
lar .. .purpose," its primary effect must be one that "neither advances
nor inhibits religion," and it must not foster "excessive government entan-
glement with religion."'2 3 Since the courts, especially in the high school
context, have generally not been troubled by the purpose part of the test,2
our analysis focuses initially on the effects part, and then considers the
potential problem of excessive entanglement.
A. The Effect of Student-Initiated Religious Activity
Courts have consistently held that school board recognition of student-
initiated religious activity has the effect of advancing religion and there-
fore violates the second prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test. The conclu-
sion that such recognition leads to an unconstitutional advancement of re-
ligion rests in large part on the assumption that high school students are
impressionable and immature, and thus incapable of understanding a
school board's true role when it recognizes student-initiated religious ac-
tivity. This assumption, however, is inconsistent with the position taken
by courts in other First Amendment cases involving public high school
students and is at odds with current views about the cognitive capacity of
adolescents.
23. Id. at 612-13. For an extensive history of establishment clause doctrine, see Note, The Consti-
tutionality of Student-Initiated Religious Meetings on Public School Grounds, 50 U. CIN. L. REV.
740, 741-59 (1981).
24. In practice the courts have considered state action sufficiently secular in its purpose so long as
the state's motive is "arguably nonreligious." L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 14-8, at 835; see Mueller v.
Allen, 51 U.S.L.W. 5050, 5052 (U.S. June 29, 1983) ("[G]overnment assistance programs have con-
sistently survived [the purpose] inquiry even when they have run afoul of other aspects of the Lemon
framework. . . . This reflects . . . our reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned from the face
of the statute.").
The secular purpose threshold is indeed so low that it can usually be met simply by citing a state
disclaimer of religious purpose, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, or, in the case of school involvement with
religion, an arguably educational goal, Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1312 n.1 (8th Cir. 1980),
afld sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). But see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-
44 (1980) (per curiam) (legislative disclaimer insufficient where state requirement has predominantly
religious purpose); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038,
1044-45 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting school board claim of secular purpose in recognizing student reli-
gious group).
Moreover, a purpose is not deemed "religious" merely because it "coincidels] with the beliefs of one
religion or [takes] its origins from another." L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 14-8, at 835; see Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) ("It does not follow that a statute violates the establishment clause
because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' ").
Religious purpose has been the decisive factor in striking down a state action only when the pre-
dominant or sole reason for such action could be the advancement of religion. See Stone, 449 U.S. at
42-44 (state requirement that Ten Commandments be posted on wall of each public school found to
result from preeminently religious purpose); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) ("The
overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it
proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular. . . interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.") (emphasis added).
Religion in Public High Schools
1. Brandon, Widmar, and the Emphasis on Immaturity
In Brandon v. Board of Education25 and other cases dealing with reli-
gion in the high school setting,26 the supposedly impressionable nature of
the audience has prompted the courts to conclude that official recognition
of a student-initiated religious organization unavoidably produces a pri-
marily religious effect. In Brandon, the Second Circuit stated that:
To an impressionable student, even the mere appearance of secular
involvement in religious activities might indicate that the state has
placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This symbolic
inference is too dangerous to permit . . . . An adolescent may per-
ceive "voluntary" school prayer in a different light if he were to see
the captain of the school's football team, the student body president,
or the leading actress in a dramatic production participating in com-
munal prayer meetings in the "captive audience" setting of a
school.
27
The argument that a primarily religious effect could be caused by the
inability of high school students to perceive correctly the role of the school
board contains two parts. First, students could conclude that the board
was endorsing, rather than merely accommodating, religion. Second, mis-
taken imputation of state endorsement of religion could produce the unin-
tended but real effect of changing the audience's religious practices or
views.
Courts have consistently employed this argument when examining
whether school board involvement with religion produces a primarily reli-
gious effect. They have decided the underlying constitutional question by
25. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). In Brandon, public high
school students who organized a group called "Students for Voluntary Prayer" instituted an action for
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the local school board for an allegedly unconstitu-
tional refusal to allow the group to conduct communal prayer meetings in the school immediately
before the school day began. Id. at 973. The court held that if the school board had granted recogni-
tion to the prayer group it would have violated the establishment clause. Id. at 979.
26. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1048 (5th
Cir. 1982) (school district policy permitting students to gather voluntarily at school with supervision
either before or after regular school hours for educational, moral, religious, or ethical purposes vio-
lated establishment clause and was not necessary to avoid violation of free exercise clause); Johnson v.
Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 15-17, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 51-53
(1977) (denied public high school students declaratory and injunctive relief from a school district's
refusal to grant formal recognition of their religious organizations, concluding that an unintended
religious effect would result if such organizations were granted recognition and extended support); see
also Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266-67 (S.D. W. Va. 1971) (holding that school
recognition of student-initiated religious activity would result in state advancement of religion);
Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 6-8, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 916-17 (1978) (same); Commis-
sioner of Educ. v. School Comm., 358 Mass. 776, 778-80, 267 N.E.2d 226, 227-28 (1971) (same),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971). But see Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Mich. 1965)
(holding that student-initiated religious activity is constitutionally permissible).
27. 635 F.2d at 978.
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assuming that the cognitive capacity of high school students is not ade-
quately developed. Thus, in the high school setting, the immaturity of the
student makes any accommodation of student-initiated religious activity an
unconstitutional advancement of religion. In contrast, when the state is
involved with religious activity in other settings, the courts generally as-
sume that the relevant audience is capable of correctly perceiving when
the state's purpose is secular.2" Consequently, the courts are willing to
tolerate religious accommodation by the state in settings other than the
public high school.
The conclusion that student immaturity leads to an establishment clause
violation is further supported by a Supreme Court dictum in Widmar v.
Vincent.2" There, the Court held that a state university regulation prohib-
iting the use of university buildings on grounds "for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching"3 was unconstitutional, and rejected claims
that allowing such religious use would violate the establishment clause. In
Widmar, the Court noted that "[u]niversity students are . . . less impres-
sionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the
University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."3' Thus, Widmar
appears to endorse implicitly the result and reasoning of prior lower court
decisions that denied permission for student-initiated religious activities in
public high schools.
2. James, Tinker, and the Maturity of High School Students in Non-
religious Cases
The view of the high school student adopted by the courts in religious
cases conflicts directly with the position taken when nonreligious forms of
28. See Marsh v. Chambers, 51 U.S.L.W. 5162, 5164 (U.S. July 5, 1983) (practice of beginning
each session of state legislature with prayer by chaplain paid by state did not "symbolically plac[e] the
government's 'official seal of approval on one religious view.' "); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 936
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (government financial support of papal mass had intended secular effect of accom-
modating free expression and affirming principle of freedom of demonstration); Bogen v. Doty, 598
F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1979) (practice of having prayers led by local unpaid clergyman preceding
county board meetings did not have a religious effect: "a primary effect of this activity will simply be
the accomplishment of the board's purpose of establishing order and a solemn tone for the meeting");
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 33-34 (10th Cir. 1973) (maintenance of illuminated
granite monolith, on which the Ten Commandments together with other symbols were inscribed,
involved a primarily secular rather than religious purpose and effect); Citizens Concerned for Separa-
tion of Church & State v. City & County of Denver, 508 F. Supp. 823, 826-827 (D. Colo. 1981)
(Denver's secular purpose in appropriating funds for inclusion of nativity scene in its Christmas
block-long lighting display had primarily secular effect); Allen v. Morton, 333 F. Supp. 1088, 1092-
97 (D.D.C. 1971) (construction and maintenance of creche in "Christmas Pageant of Peace" celebra-
tion on federal park land immediately adjacent to White House did not have substantial religious
impact).
29. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
30. Id. at 265 n.3.
31. Id. at 274 n.14.
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First Amendment activity are at issue. For example, in James v. Board of
Education,32 the Second Circuit held that a school board could not, with-
out violating the First Amendment, discharge a high school teacher who
wore a black armband in class to protest the Vietnam War. The court
concluded that "[i]t does not appear . . . that any student believed the
armband to be anything more than a benign symbolic expression of the
teacher's personal views."' 33 Thus the court found no danger of mistaken
imputation of expression to the school board; the students were deemed
able to distinguish between personal and official views and to form their
own opinions without undue influence from others.
A comparison of the reasoning in Brandon and James raises two ques-
tions. First, if students are mature enough to isolate a teacher's views from
those of the school board, why are they not able to distinguish a school
board's accommodation of student-initiated religious expression from the
endorsement of religion? Second, if students are not coerced by a teacher's
active endorsement of a political viewpoint inside the classroom, why
would they be coerced by the school board's passive accommodation of
student-led religious activity outside the classroom? The contradiction is
particularly striking given that the judge who wrote both the James and
Brandon opinions acknowledged in James that "a teacher may have a far
more pervasive influence over a student than would one student over
another.
'34
The Second Circuit's emphasis in James on freedom of expression was
grounded in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District.5 There,
three public school students, thirteen, fifteen, and sixteen years old, were
suspended from school for wearing black armbands to protest the war in
Vietnam. The Court held that the students' conduct was not disruptive,
did not impinge on the rights of others, and was within the protection of
the free speech clause of the First Amendment. Although Tinker did not
explicitly discuss the students' maturity, intelligence, and impressionabil-
ity, it is fair to conclude that "implicit in upholding the rights of students
to express themselves peacefully on school premises is the assumption that
both the disseminating students and their target audience are capable of
dealing with controversy and indeed should be encouraged to do so. '"36
In cases involving political, social, and moral issues, the courts, follow-
32. 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).
33. Id. at 574.
34. Id. at 573.
35. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial
Review, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1491 (1972) (emphasis added). Nahmod argues that Tinker and
the underground newspaper cases have blurred the line between high school and university students.
Id.
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ing the principles laid down in Tinker, have denied local school boards
the authority to censor or control the student body's exposure to ideas that
the school board does not support.3" Courts have imposed these limits on
school board authority despite the substantial educational interest of
school boards in avoiding the imputation of unendorsed views.38 Even
where there is a significant risk of students imputing controversial speech
to the school board, as in a school-sponsored newspaper or political ex-
pression by a teacher, the school board still has not been permitted to
censor such expression. Indeed, the Court has underscored the importance
of exposing students to a broad range of ideas and has stated that "the
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' "3'
The court's view of the high school student should not change merely
because religious speech is involved. While establishment clause concerns
are present only when religious speech is at issue, the school board, when
dealing with nonreligious speech, still has a "substantial interest" in
preventing mistaken imputation. Indeed, this substantial interest is essen-
tially similar to the First Amendment right of an individual to refuse to
foster ideas that he finds repugnant:
[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all . . . . A system which secures
the right to proselytize religious, political and ideological causes must
37. Post-Tinker cases include: Gambino v. Fairfax City School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736-37
(E.D. Va. 1977) (enjoining school board from prohibiting the publication in school newspaper of
article entitled "Sexually Active Students Fail to Use Contraception"), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 157
(4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (high school officials
would violate students' First Amendment rights by restraining distribution of school newspaper con-
taining information about birth control), afl'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Shanley v. Northeast
Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970-72 (5th Cir. 1972) (First Amendment rights of high school
seniors violated when school board suspended them for distributing an "underground" newspaper that
advocated review of laws regarding marijuana use and offered information about birth control). In
these cases, the courts were willing to allow student exposure to the controversial issues in question in
spite of the danger of a mistaken belief on the part of students that the school was approving of the
viewpoint expressed and the risk that the students would be unduly influenced by others. But cf
Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir. 1971) (scope of First Amendment rights should vary
with age and maturity of students; high school setting places special limitations on First Amendment
rights).
38. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1979) (school has "substantial
educational interest in avoiding the impression that it has authorized a specific expression"), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
39. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends tipon . . . that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritarian selec-
tion.' ") (citation omitted).
While Keyishian dealt with students at the university level, the view expressed in that case has been
echoed in cases dealing with high schools students. See Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School
Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (D. Mass. 1978) ("The most effective antidote to the poison of
mindless orthodoxy is ready access to a broad sweep of ideas and philosophies.").
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also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such
concepts.
The First Amendment protects the right of individuals . . . to re-
fuse to foster . . . an idea that they find morally objectionable.4
Because of the school board's traditional role in supporting the values of
the community, it has a compelling interest in avoiding any misunder-
standing of its views on all religious, political, and ideological issues.
Thus, it is theoretically unsound to focus on the alleged immaturity of
high school students only in cases involving religion. 41
3. Adolescent Psychology and the View of the High School Student as
an Independent Individual
Research in the field of adolescent psychology suggests that high school
students are generally independent and capable of critical inquiry. It
therefore supports the Second Circuit's assessment in James and contra-
dicts that court's view in Brandon. Three basic conclusions may be drawn
from the empirical research. First, adolescence is a time of markedly in-
creased cognitive capacity.42 The adolescent has the capability to engage in
40. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (citation omitted); see Lipp v. Morris, 579
F.2d 834, 835-36 (3d Cir. 1978) (statute requiring public school students to stand at attention during
pledge of allegiance struck down because student has right to resist forced expression of patriotism);
Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1045 (D.D.C. 1979) (statute directing government to sell
firearms at a discount only to members of certain rifle associations struck down in part because it
infringed on fundamental interests of individuals who wished not to be associated with a group whose
views they found obnoxious). In Wooley, the Court held that a New Hampshire driver need not have
the motto, "Live Free or Die," posted on his license plate if such an ideology is repugnant to him.
Implicit here was a recognition that endorsement of the ideological statement might be imputed to the
owner of the vehicle upon which it was posted, and that the owner has a First Amendment right to
resist such imputation.
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), however, the Supreme Court held
that California state constitutional provisions that permit individuals to exercise free speech and peti-
tion rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited did not
violate the free speech rights of the owner under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court
specifically distinguished the case from Wooley on the ground that when an owner invites the public
to enter premises, the views disseminated by patrons on the premises "will not likely be identified
with those of the owner." Id. at 87.
41. In addition, an imputation problem could be remedied by a disclaimer. The Court has held
that mistaken imputation can be easily prevented by posting signs or notices that effectively disclaim
any endorsement or support of the views expressed during the student-initiated religious activity.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) ("[Alppellants can expressly disavow
any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers
stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could explain that
the persons are communicating their own messages."). Such disclaimers would prevent mistaken ideas
about school recognition of the religious activity by emphasizing the school's secular objectives and its
promotion of freedom of expression.
42. Stage theories of cognitive and moral development, based on the work of Jean Piaget, suggest
that people develop new modes of thought in a series of clearly definable stages. Piaget discovered that
differences in thinking between adolescence and childhood are differences in kind and not just degree.
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fairly sophisticated and complex intellectual functions. Second, adolescence
is a time of increasing independence with respect to both authority figures
and peers;4 the adolescent is increasingly able to reject the views of
others. Third, adolescence is a time when a new self-identity is established
and personal ideals and values are formed. 44 In his attempt to create a
His research suggests that the more sophisticated cognitive capacity of the adolescent, particularly the
late adolescent, is sufficient to allow the student to form his own ideas, to debate and disagree with his
peers, and to act on his own beliefs as an autonomous individual. Piaget concluded that "[the great
novelty that characterizes adolescent thought . . . does not reach its point of equilibrium until the age
of fourteen or fifteen." Piaget, The Intellectual Development of the Adolescent, in ADOLESCENCE 23
(G. Caplan & S. Lebovici eds. 1969). In other words, Piaget's research showed that most of the
adolescents tested could think on an abstract, logical level by the age of 14 or 15.
Based on his research, Piaget formulated a four-stage theory of mental and moral development,
concluding that the last stage, the formal operational stage, typically occurs between the ages of 12
and 15. In this stage, the child begins to think in abstract terms, to reason by hypothesis, and to
consider ideological problems. The child sets aside his belief in the infallibility of his parents and
teachers, and no longer accepts adult authority without question; he becomes capable of independent
analysis and autonomous moral thought. See also Osterrieth, Adolescence: Some Psychological As-
pects, in ADOLESCENCE 14-15 (G. Caplan & S. Lebovici eds. 1969) (describing evolution of formal
thought process). Thus, by the time the adolescent enters high school at approximately the age of 15,
he should generally be able to engage in critical inquiry, debate, and discussion at a fairly abstract
and sophisticated level.
A great deal of research has confirmed Piaget's view that formal operational thought and autono-
mous morality are typically reached during adolescence. See Gallagher & Noppe, Cognitive Develop-
ment and Learning, in UNDERSTANDING ADOLESCENCE 208-16 (J. Adams ed. 1976). Gallagher and
Noppe conclude that much of the later research has confirmed the basic validity of Piaget's findings,
citing in particular Lovell's follow-up study in which the results of Piaget's experiments were sub-
stantially reproduced. Id. at 215.
A few studies have concluded, however, that the achievement of formal operational thought during
adolescence may not be as prevalent as Piaget's research suggests it to be. See Kohlberg & Gilligan,
The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World, 100 DAEDA-
LUS 1051, 1065 (1971) (reporting findings that only 45% of the adolescents tested had reached formal
operations by age 15). Of course, the fact that some adolescents are unable to perform certain func-
tions requiring formal thought does not indicate that there are no significant differences between the
intellectual development of the adolescent and the child. Indeed, even those researchers and theorists
that dispute stage theories of cognitive development agree that "[tihere are differences of major practi-
cal significance between the cognitive activity of the adolescent and the child." Keating, Thinking
Processes and Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 215 (J. Adelson ed. 1980).
43. The adolescent's increasing independence suggests that the courts' fear of undue influence
from peer pressure in the context of student-initiated religious activity at the high school level is
unfounded; peer group values are not as significant as is commonly assumed. "We can be fairly
confident in saying that conformity is at its height among the early adolescent group but that it dimin-
ishes significantly from about fourteen or fifteen onward . . . . Evidently, by middle adolescence some
individuals are beginning to be able to see the advantages to be gained by independence, and the
number taking such a view clearly increases rapidly from this stage onward." Coleman, Friendship
and the Peer Group in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 424-25 (J. Adelson
ed. 1980). Thus the danger of conformity decreases rapidly during high school.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that peer pressure may be even less significant with regard to
student decisions on religious matters. "Although the adolescent moves initially in the direction of the
more liberal peer group, there is evidence . . . to suggest that, for basic life decisions, the standards of
the family carry more weight than the peer group when the two are in conflict." Hamacheck, Devel-
opment and Dynamics of the Self, in UNDERSTANDING ADOLESCENCE 162 (J. Adams ed. 1976).
Thus, if the family discourages participation in the religious activity, it is unlikely that peer pressure
alone will induce the unwilling student to participate.
44. The importance of adolescence as a time of self-identification was established largely through
the work of Eric Erikson. See E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968). Erikson's theory of
adolescence complements Piaget's conclusion that the adolescent is capable of autonomous moral
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new self-identity, the adolescent is exposed to a broad range of values and
experiences.
An adolescent's increased independence and self-identification enables
him to differentiate himself from the authority figures he depended on as
a child.4 Adolescents expect respect and tolerance from school authorities,
and are quick to notice when these authorities attempt to control their
activities."' Additionally, because their cognitive capacity has significantly
developed since childhood, adolescents can understand the difference be-
tween "neutral accommodation" and "indoctrination." Given the in-
creased cognitive capacity and the psychological separation between the
self and authority figures that occurs during adolescence, high school may
in fact be a time when the distinction between tolerance based on mutual
respect and explicit approval of student expression is particularly
clear-even more clear, perhaps, than in later stages of life. Thus, not
only is the high school student able to make such a distinction, he is also
likely to do so.
This understanding of adolescent psychology supports the conclusion
that fears of adolescent impressionability and immaturity do not justify
limitations on high school students' religious expression and activity. Fur-
ther, it undercuts the Brandon view that impressionability and immaturity
lead to a violation of the second prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test.
Indeed, school board recognition of student-initiated religious activity need
not raise establishment clause concerns. Instead, it may represent a com-
mendable tolerance of a diversity of views and an approval of First
Amendment free speech values.47
thought by noting that adolescence is the time when many facets of an individual's personality come
together to form a coherent sense of self. Id. at 159-65. Erikson emphasizes that adolescence is a
transitional stage between childhood and adulthood in which the adolescent is engaged in determining
who he is and what he is to become. Id. In seeking to establish a new identity and in adopting new
ideas, the adolescent increasingly questions and challenges the authority figures of his childhood. Id. at
28, 30, 246-47. Thus, the process of self-identification requires the adolescent to make sharp distinc-
tions between his views and the views of others.
45. See Windmiller, Moral Development, in UNDERSTANDING ADOLESCENCE 186 (J. Adams ed.
1976) ("[Wlhere once the child derived his identity from his integration within the family structure,
now in order to achieve his own sense of self there must be at least a psychological separation from
the family unit. During the process of identity formation the adolescent is constantly testing out ideas
and seeking confirmation of his new self."). Thus, independence, self-identification, and psychological
separation from authority figures are interrelated processes.
46. See K. GARRISON & K. GARRISON, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 79 (1975) ("The adoles-
cent is likely to resent authoritative control. The self-conscious attitude so clearly displayed at this
stage of life marks him as an individual on the alert, watching for someone to consider him as a child
and thus boss him around.").
47. In O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979), for example, the court noted that the
permission of religious expression on government property (in this case a papal mass on the National
Mall) promoted the principle of freedom of demonstration and accommodation of diverse viewpoints:
Appellants say that the government permit for this occurrence on the renowned National Mall
sends an implied message-to the nation and to the world-of government approval (and
therefore "establishment") of this church service. It implies no more approval for this church
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B. Minimizing Entanglement
The third prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, excessive entanglement
with religion, is also relevant to the constitutionality of student-initiated
religious activity. Courts have suggested that such activity not only will
produce a primarily religious effect but also may raise insurmountable
"'excessive entanglement" problems.48 The courts' concern has been that
the school will become so entangled with the religious activity that it is no
longer simply accommodating, but rather endorsing, the activity.49
Behind this concern may lie a more fundamental objection: that there is
no place for religion in the public schools.50 Thus, any entanglement be-
tween church and public high school would be deemed "excessive." This
fundamental objection is perhaps implicit in the contrast between the
courts' willingness to reject excessive entanglement claims outside the high
school setting51 and to accept such claims in the high school setting. The
objection that there is no place for religion in the public schools, however,
has never been an acceptable component of the constitutional analysis of
the establishment clause. Indeed, the acceptance of such an objection
would render the constitutional analysis useless and preordain the out-
come of any establishment clause claim in the public school setting.
The courts' concern with the excessive entanglement problem may also
be explained by the relationship between excessive entanglement and the
than for any other group using the Mall. The message that it does send to the world is ap-
proval of the principle of freedom of demonstration, for all groups, for all religions, even for
those opposing religion.
Id. at 936.
48. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1047 (5th
Cir. 1982) (holding that use of school facilities and continuing supervision creates excessive entangle-
ment); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[Ain excessive involvement of
the state in religious matters would have resulted if the students' requests [for religious extracurricular
activity] were granted."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
49. See Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1976) ("Neutrality is what is
required . . . [Tihe State's efforts to perform a secular task, and at the same time avoid aiding in the
performance of a religious one, may not lead into such an intimate relationship with religious author-
ity that it appears either to be sponsoring or to be excessively interfering with the authority.") (em-
phasis added); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (distinguishing permissible ac-
commodation from impermissible endorsement by school authorities). But cf Note, supra note 23, at
776 ("IT]he [excessive entanglement] question reduces to whether or not student initiated religious
meetings on school grounds result in continuing official surveillance that produces strife and ill-will
between church and state.").
50. See, e.g., D. BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 269-97 (1965) (dis-
cussing separatist attitudes of educators toward religion in public schools); W. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 37-58 (1967) (discussing attitudes toward religion in
public schools and, in particular, separatist attitude of certain school officials that religion has no place
in the public schools).
51. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of
statute authorizing state aid to private Maryland institutions of higher learning, including religiously
affiliated institutions, which met certain minimum criteria); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 936
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (government financial support of papal mass on National Mall held not to be exces-
sive entanglement).
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purpose and effect components of the three-part establishment clause test.
Although the Supreme Court has framed the test as consisting of three
discrete elements, the logic behind the establishment clause suggests that
the central concern of the courts is the effect of state action on religion.52
While entanglement is generally stated to be a separate indication of con-
stitutionality, it can also be viewed as an evidentiary device for determin-
ing whether state action will produce a religious effect. This accords with
the courts' concern that excessive entanglement will cause a primarily reli-
gious effect through active endorsement rather than mere accommodation
of the activity.
In evaluating an excessive entanglement claim in the high school con-
text, one needs to consider two issues: First, the quantity of support the
school extends to the activity; and second, the manner-in which the school
board allows the activity to be conducted. The consideration of these issues
can provide criteria for the design of permissible student-initiated religious
programs.
1. Quantity of Support
The excessive entanglement test does not pose a complete bar to state
aid to religious organizations. The neutral accommodation of religion, sec-
52. The Supreme Court has often construed the establishment clause as a guarantee of religious
voluntarism. For example, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947), it stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
Similarly, in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Justice Goldberg wrote that
"Itlhe fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither engage in nor com-
pel religious practices, [and] that it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreli-
gion." Id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
An alternative view is that the basic premise behind the establishment clause is not the notion of
voluntarism, but a notion of separatism requiring "a wall ...between church and state." See L.
TRIBE, supra note 15, § 14-3, at 817. This principle of separation was designed to "safeguard the
state against ecclesiastical depradations and incursions," id., §14-3, at 816, and "to protect the church
from the danger of destruction which . . . inevitably flowed from control by even the best-intentioned
civil authorities," Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 n.20 (1962). Thus, James Madison advised "an
entire abstinance [sic] of the Government from [religious] interference in any way whatever, beyond
the necessity of preserving public order, and protecting each sect against trespass on its legal rights by
others." 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 487 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
The logical implications of this principle would require the maintenance of wholly separate reli-
gious and secular spheres. The courts, however, have recognized that this wall of separation is in fact
"a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
ship." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). Thus, Tribe, discussing the twin values of
separatism and voluntarism that lie behind the religion clauses of the Constitution, concludes that
"voluntarism may be the more fundamental." L. TRIBE, supra, § 14-4, at 818-19; see Gianelli, Reli-
gious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 514-22 (1968)
(supporting proposition that voluntarism is predominant principle behind establishment clause).
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ular in purpose and effect, is clearly permissible. 3 To deny religious or-
ganizations all protection and support solely because of their religious
character would be to "find in the Constitution a requirement that the
government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would
be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe." '54
Courts have held that, given a secular purpose and effect, some state
entanglement with religion is permissible, but have not explicitly deter-
mined at what point entanglement becomes "excessive." In general, reli-
gious entanglement is permissible only when it has the effect of accommo-
dating, and not endorsing, religious activity.55  Zorach v. Clauson56
provides more specific guidance in the public school context. There, a
teacher was permitted to cooperate in a student- off-campus release pro-
gram "to the extent of making it possible for her students to participate in
it."'57 This case suggests that courts may judge state support of student-
53. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding, against establishment claim, student
release program allowing public school students to leave school building for religious instruction and
devotional exercises).
Justice White argued that neutral accommodation of religion should be permissible, pointing out
that the "'limits of permissible state accommodation of religion are by no means coextensive with the
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. To equate the two would be to deny a na-
tional heritage with roots in the Revolution itself.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 664 (1971)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). Thus, more accommodation
than that which is compelled by the free exercise clause is permissible. But Justice White is quick to
qualify that in order for unrequired accommodation to avoid an establishment clause violation, its
purpose and effect must be secular. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-70 (1976)
(White, J., concurring).
54. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
55. See supra note 49.
56. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
57. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court made clear that the teacher's cooperation in
a religious program would not constitute excessive entanglement regardless of "lw]hether she does it
occasionally for a few students, regularly for one, or pursuant to a systematized program designed to
further the religious needs of all the students." Id. at 313. The Second Circuit's recent comments in
Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 U.S. 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981),
regarding the supposedly excessive entanglement caused by teacher supervision of student religious
activity, directly contradict the Supreme Court's position in Zorach. The Second Circuit found the
continual aspect of the supervision determinative of causing excessive entanglement: "[T]he School
Board has demonstrated that an excessive involvement of the state in religious matters would have
resulted if the students' request were granted. . . . [I]f the state must engage in continual administra-
tive supervision of nonsecular activity, church and state are excessively intertwined." 635 F.2d at 979;
see Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
For cases implicitly following the Zorach doctrine of discounting the continual character of the
entanglement, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (weekly use of university buildings for
religious worship and study and university scheduling and general administrative monitoring of meet-
ings as one of many extracurricular activities did not constitute excessive entanglement); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (occasional audits of grant subsidy program not excessive
entanglement); Holt v. Thompson, 66 Wis. 2d 659, 225 N.W.2d 678 (1975) (filing of weekly or
monthly attendance reports by the public school to insure released students go to religious centers
represents only insignificant entanglement). See generally Toms & Whitehead, The Religious Student
in Public Education: Resolving a Constitutional Dilemma, 27 EMORY L.J. 3, 24-26 (1978) (discuss-
ing excessive entanglement in public high schools); Note, supra note 23, at 773-79 (arguing that
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initiated religious activity to be permissible accommodation so long as it
does not exceed the amount minimally required to maintain the activity's
existence.
The "minimally required support" principle suggested in Zorach v.
Clauson5" is an appropriate evidentiary standard. It allows the court to
determine whether the school board's support will itself advance religion,
or whether it will merely sustain the activity's existence and allow "the
advancement of religion [to] come . . . from the voluntary support of its
followers." 5 While this standard does not identify the precise point at
which state support turns from accommodation to endorsement, it does
direct the court's attention to potentially dangerous gratuitous support.
Such aid may unnecessarily supplement the voluntary efforts of the activ-
ity's participants and cause state advancement of religion.60 Thus, a school
board's showing that it has extended only enough support to allow the
activity to continue its existence is probative of accommodation of religious
interests, and consequently, of a primarily secular effect. On the other
hand, a finding that the school board has extended more than the mini-
mally required support is probative of state advancement of religious in-
terests, and consequently, of a primarily religious effect.
The language used by some courts could imply that religious organiza-
tions in the high school setting may be given as much support as other
student-initiated extracurricular activities, and that such support would
not violate the establishment clause."1 This argument, however, is flawed
because it focuses on equality rather than accommodation. Proving that a
student-initiated religious activity receives the same quantity of support as
student-initiated secular activity does not determine whether the quantity
of support merely accommodates, or rather endorses, the religious activity.
The relevant concern must be whether the quantity of the state's support
for religion produces a primarily religious effect, and not whether the
support is greater or less than the support extended to secular activities.
Similarly, a school board cannot justify exceeding the minimally re-
quired support standard by showing that its sole purpose was to confer
student-initiated religious activity in public school classroom need not constitute excessive
entanglement).
58. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
59. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 14-4, at 818 (1978).
60. The minimally required support standard captures the core notion of accommodation: "The
fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither engage in nor compel
religious practices .... and (at the same time] that [government] work deterrence of no religious
belief." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
61. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (no constitutional requirement that gov-
ernment be hostile to religion and "throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of
religious influence"); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (fact that "religious and
nonreligious groups and events are treated alike ... undercuts appellant's Establishment claim").
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related secular benefits on participating students. The excessive entangle-
ment test provides a wholly separate indication of probable effect from
that provided by the purpose test. 2 That extensive school board support
emanated from a purely secular intent does not prevent that support from
becoming a source of religious advancement."3 Thus, the probable effect of
school board entanglement with religion should be examined by inquiring,
without regard to school board intent, whether the support extended to the
activity is greater than that minimally required for students to carry out
that activity."
2. Manner in Which the Activity Is Conducted
In order for the school board to avoid advancing religion, it must also
ensure that attendance at the religious activity is entirely student-initi-
ated.65 If the student is required to participate in, attend, or even take
affirmative action to absent himself from the religious activity, his involve-
ment with religion becomes school-initiated. In this sense, any audience
that has not freely chosen to attend can be deemed "captive." If the school
board allows a student religious activity to be conducted before a captive
audience, it is imposing religion on those who might not otherwise have
chosen to participate. Such a religious effect would clearly violate the es-
tablishment clause.
6
62. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 657-62 (1980) (extensive separate
"excessive entanglement" analysis of statute directing payments to nonpublic schools); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976) (recognizing the independent quality of the excessive
entanglement test).
63. This point illustrates the need for the purpose and entanglement tests to be applied separately.
Each is an independent gauge of the probable effect of a state action and measures different factors
which could cause state involvement with religion to produce a primarily religious effect.
64. Rigorous adherence to the principle of minimally required support would allow the provision
only of a meeting place and faculty supervisor to maintain safety and order. Under ordinary circum-
stances, nothing more would be necessary for the student religious activity "to sustain its existence" on
school premises. Additional support would be permissible only if it could be shown that such support
was necessary for the activity to continue its existence as a student-initiated and student-run program.
65. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963) (no state law or school
board may require that Bible passages be read in schools at the beginning of each day-even if
individual students may be excused from attending or participating in such exercises); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (statute requiring reading of a nondenominational prayer held to violate the
establishment clause even though it allowed students to remain silent or to leave the room during
prayer).
66. See Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 863 (1981). The court concentrated heavily on the element of a captive audience in denying
permission for student-initiated prayer at voluntary school assemblies:
[T]he activity in our case goes beyond symbolic inference. The Chandler students must either
listen to a prayer chosen by a select group of students or forego the opportunity to attend a
major school function. It is difficult to conceive how this choice would not coerce a student
wishing to be part of the social mainstream and, thus, advance one group's religious beliefs.
Id. at 762; see Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417, 425-27 (E.D. Ark.
1973) (establishment clause violated when school board permitted members of student council to read
Bible verses and recite the Lord's Prayer to the captive audience of a homeroom class).
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The courts must be alert to subtle forms of school-initiated attendance.
Any incentive making attendance more desirable than absence impinges
on establishment clause values. Student religious activity could, therefore,
be held only before or after the school day, or during a free period, to
prevent students from attending the activity as a means of avoiding un-
pleasant curricular matters.6 7 School-initiated attendance would also re-
sult if faculty encouraged participation or took an active role in organizing
or leading the group. Certainly, any "rebate for participation" such as
forensic credit would induce attendance and thus be impermissible."8
In general, courts can approve school board recognition and support of
student-initiated religious activity only if the school board's purpose is not
predominantly religious, 9 its support does not exceed that amount mini-
mally required to sustain the activity's existence, and the activity does not
involve a captive audience. In such cases, state advancement of religion
would not occur, and the establishment clause could thus not be consid-
ered a compelling state interest to justify a blanket, content-based prior
restraint on otherwise protected religious speech.
III. Other State Interests Justifying Exclusion of Student Religious
Expression
Even if student-initiated religious expression cannot be restricted be-
cause of establishment clause concerns, the school board could regulate or
exclude such speech for other "compelling state interests." The majority
in Widmar v. Vincent7" applied the standard of review generally appro-
priate for content-based exclusions: "[The University] must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."7 1 Later in the majority opinion, the
Court again emphasized that it required "the most exacting scrutiny in
cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its
content."
7 2
While the Widmar Court thus seems to require a state interest of the
same order as is necessary to justify prior restraints in other contexts,
73 it
67. This may be seen as simply the reverse notion of that expressed by the court in Collins, 644
F.2d 762. There, students were held to be religiously coerced when faced with the choice between not
attending a desirable school function and attending religious activity connected with that function.
Here, the student would be religiously "coerced" when faced with a choice between attending an
undesirable school function and attending religious activities.
68. This is simply a more extreme case of the type of religious "coercion" referred to in Collins.
69. See supra note 24.
70. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
71. Id. at 270.
72. Id. at 276.
73. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) ("Any system of
prior restraints on expression comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
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also acknowledges the "right of the University to make academic judg-
ments as to how best to allocate scarce resources.17 4 The Widmar majority
recognized that a "university differs in significant respects from public
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its
authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities." '
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Widmar,8 saw these two themes
embraced by the majority as fundamentally irreconcilable." Indeed, it
would seem difficult for the university to have virtually untrammelled dis-
cretion to make "allocative decisions" and "reasonable regulations" if it is
subject to the same exacting scrutiny as are prior restraints imposed, for
example, on the press.78 Justice Stevens resolved this apparent conflict in
favor of academic discretion. He contends that allocative decisions should
and must consider the content of the proposed activity. 9 "Judgments of
this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges, and their
standards for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases
like compelling state interest."8 To allow the university sufficient admin-
istrative discretion, Justice Stevens would require that the school board
have only "a valid reason" for denying recognition to student
organizations.81
By decreasing the strength of the state interest necessary to justify a
content-based regulation of student extracurricular expression, Justice
Stevens implies that such expression is less worthy of constitutional pro-
tection than other speech protected by the First Amendment. This accords
with Justice Stevens' willingness to rank the value of speech in other con-
texts. In Young v. American Mini Theatres8 and FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation,"3 he indicates that offensive, but not obscene, speech could be regu-
lated more easily than other forms of speech closer to the protective core of
the First Amendment (for example, political speech).84 In Widmar, he
tional validity.") (citation omitted); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (prior restraint on
release of motion pictures bears a heavy burden of justification).
74. 454 U.S. at 276.
75. Id. at 268 n.5.
76. Id. at 277 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
77. Id. at 277,78.
78. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
79. 454 U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
80. Id. at 278-79.
81. Id. at 280. Justice Stevens does not explain why "a valid reason" is less ambiguous than "a
compelling state interest."
82. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
83. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion).
84. See id. at 740-48 (recognizing that Pacifica's broadcast was protected speech, but noting that
its "vulgar, offensive, and shocking character undercut absolute constitutional protection."); American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70 ("[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not
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suggests that it is the unique academic context that devalues the speech. 5
Such judicial value judgments seem constitutionally untenable."' In or-
der for the Court to promulgate stable and consistent constitutional rul-
ings, it must require the same degree of state interest to regulate the con-
tent of protected speech regardless of context and content. "Degrees of
protection" could well lead to the "gentrification" of the marketplace of
ideas. That is, by ranking speech, courts could confine expression to that
which comports with the upper-middle class values of the judiciary.
Justice Stevens' error in Widmar seems to flow from a failure to distin-
guish the university's discretion to regulate curriculum matters from its
discretion to regulate protected speech. Schools do have virtually untram-
melled discretion to allocate resources and make reasonable regulations
with regard to course offerings and schedules, faculty hiring, and book
purchases for the school library. 7 But in those contexts, a forum for stu-
dent expression and participation has not been opened. 8 Once such a fo-
rum has been opened, however, the school's discretion to regulate speech
according to content must be subject to the same constitutional restrictions
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest
that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magni-
tude than the interest in untrammelled political debate.").
85. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278-80 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
86. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are
free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is
most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most protection, and which is less 'valuable' and hence
deserving of less protection."); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 85 (1976) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) ("What this case does involve is the constitutional permissibility of selective interference
with protected speech whose content is thought to produce distasteful effects. It is elementary that a
prime function of the First Amendment is to guard against just such interference."). Justice Brennan
notes in his dissent in Pacifica Foundation that only a plurality in both Young and Pacifica Founda-
tion embraced the notion, "completely antithetical to basic First Amendment values, that the degree of
protection the First Amendment affords protected speech varies with the social value ascribed to that
speech by five Members of [the] Court." Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 762-63 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Commentators have also criticized the notion of a scale of First Amendment protection. See, e.g.,
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 451-453 (1980)
(criticizing Court's willingness to weigh social value of protected expression); Stone, Restrictions of
Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
81, 96-99, 108-115 (1978) (recognition of judicial valuation of speech in Young and discussion of
objective standards for subject matter restrictions); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 57, 151-57 (1978) (national standard of decency stated by Court in Pacifica Foundation will
devolve into sentiment of individual judge). But see Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 749-58 (1980) (arguing content regulation cases reveal
pattern of principled decisionmaking based on a variant of equal protection analysis).
87. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2807-09 (1982) (courts should not "intervene in
the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operations of school systems" unless "basic constitu-
tional values" are "directly and sharply implicate[d] in those conflicts") (quoting Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1969)); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th
Cir. 1980) (school has "nearly plenary powers concerning curriculum, textbooks and other educa-
tional matters").
88. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-70 (discussing when a public forum is opened).
The Yale Law Journal
placed on other content-based regulations of protected speech. 9
The majority in Widmar thus correctly articulated the standard for de-
nying access on the basis of content to an open, extracurricular forum. If
resources are limited, schools may use content-neutral standards-"first
come, first served," number of student participants-to regulate entry. If
content is the basis of a decision to recognize one group over another, the
difference in educational value must be clear, articulable, and significant.
This is especially true in the extracurricular context, where the values
being cultivated are generally related not to the content of the extracurric-
ular expression, but rather to student initiative and interaction.
The courts could objectively check school board discretion to regulate
expression according to content by subjecting those discretionary decisions
to a kind of "fairness doctrine."90 Once a school recognized the educa-
tional significance of discussing one side of an issue, it could not deny
access to a group discussing any other side of the issue on the basis of the
content of the group's speech. Thus, if a school recognized a group dis-
cussing the anthropomorphic origins of religion or even atheistic existen-
tialism, it would be compelled to recognize a group exploring new direc-
tions in contemporary Christian thought and worship. Applying a fairness
doctrine to the extracurricular forum would help insure that decisions to
allocate limited resources according to the content of speech are based on
compelling policy considerations and not simply on the approval or disap-
proval of the content of the expression.
Conclusion
A public high school's official recognition of protected student-initiated
religious expression need not violate the establishment clause. The courts,
in striking down such recognition, have assumed that high school students
lack sufficient intellectual and emotional maturity to distinguish between
neutral accommodation and official endorsement, and that school recogni-
tion would therefore have a primarily religious effect. Yet, the courts have
viewed high school students as mature enough to discuss controversial
nonreligious issues without imputing endorsement of student views to the
school board. Moreover, relevant psychological research indicates that stu-
dents are able, and indeed are likely, to distinguish between accommoda-
tion and endorsement. Thus, school board recognition of student-initiated
religious expression need not produce the effect of inducing or coercing
the nonreligious to participate in religious activity.
89. Id. at 270.
90. Cf Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70, 400-01 (1969) (upholding
"fairness doctrine" that requires radio and television broadcasters to present each side of public issue
discussions with fair coverage).
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Courts can also conclude that excessive entanglement between church
and state will not produce such a primarily religious effect so long as the
quantity of school board support does not exceed the minimal amount re-
quired to sustain the activity's existence, and no captive audience is in-
volved. Once the courts determine that granting recognition would not
produce an establishment clause violation, they cannot allow the school
board, after it has opened a forum generally to student organizations, to
deny such recognition without a compelling educational reason. Any pol-
icy for granting recognition among competing proposals must be applied
even-handedly and meet the requirements of a content-neutral "fairness"
doctrine. Such an approach will not only increase the benefits accruing
from student initiative and extracurricular activity, but also affirm and
strengthen the principles of freedom of expression and association that lie
at the very core of our democratic society.
